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ARGUMENT 
THE STATE'S RESPONSIVE BRIEF FAILS TO-PERCEIVE THE 
ISSUE IN THIS CASE THAT IN ABSENCE OF A LEGISLATIVE 
MAXIMUM, PROBATION PERIODS FOR MISDEMEANORS IN UTAH 
ARE LIMITED BY THE PERIOD OF PUNISHMENT FOR THE 
OFFENSE IN QUESTION: 
Appellant believes that the majority of the arguments presented 
by respondent in its brief are answered by the original brief of 
appellant in this case. However, it is clear that respondent has 
missed the thrust of the argioment presented by appellant: that because 
the Utah legislature has not established a maximum limit for probation 
in misdemeanor cases, the maximum must be the period of incarceration 
for the offense in question. In support of this position, appellant cite 
in its original brief numerous cases which held that where no legislative 
maximum for probation occurred, the probationary period was limited 
by the period of incarceration established by the State legislature. 
See Appellant!s Brief pp. 3-14. 
Respondent admits that these cases may have had that holding 
but asserts they were overruled by subsequent legislative action. For 
example, respondent argues that "Kansas law now allows probation 
for up to four times the maximum incarceration period. . ." and that 
In re Carroll, 91 KAN. 395, 137 P. 975 (1914) ". . .has long since been 
overturned by legislative action." Respondent's Brief pp. 10-11. 
Appellant argues that respondent's phraseology is grossly misleading. 
In the Carrol case, the Kansas Supreme Court struggled with the issue 
in absence of a legislatively prescribed maximum or limit for probation. 
When, in 1947, the Kansas legislature provided such a law, the case 
rule became moot, but it was not "overturned.!f The Kansas Supreme 
Court recognized a void in the law in 1914 and filled it with its 
opinion in Carrol. Subsequent legislation was in harmony with the 
Court's opinion. Rather than being overturned or reversed, Carrol 
stands for the proposition that the concept of Due Process of Law 
requires a maximum limit for probation just as it requires a maximum 
limit for imprisonment; and that where the legislature has failed to 
establish such a maximum limit, that limit will be determined by the 
legislative limit on incarceration for the offense in question. 
Respondent uses this same reasoning in misinterpreting 
appellant's use of the Oklahoma case of Ex Parte Eaton, 29 OKLA. CRIM. 
275, 233 p. 781 (1925). Respondent argues that because the Oklahoma 
legislature acted and set a two year limit on misdemeanor probation 
that Eaton does not apply to our situation. Respondent's Brief p. 12. 
Eaton like Carrol stands for the proposition that the judiciary must 
move to fill the vacuum where a state legislature has not established 
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limits on probation; and further, that the judiciary should adopt the 
statutory punishment limit as the probation limit. The subsequent 
enactment by the Oklahoma legislature does not affect this case as 
being authority for appellant's proposition. 
Respondent observes that the Idaho cases cited by appellant 
involve felonies and then smugly dismisses them as "obviously not 
authority for appellant's position'1 (sic) Respondent's Brief p. 12. 
Idaho's statute is virtually identical to Utah's (Appellant's Brief 
p. 5) and the Idaho Supreme Court observed in two different cases that 
where no statutory maximum for probation is prescribed, the maximum 
is determined by the penalty for the offense. Respondent does not 
explain and appellant does not understand how the fact that felonies 
were involved can alter that principle developed by our sister state, 
and appellant urges this Court to reject that sort of unsupported 
assertion. 
Respondent asks this Court to reject the case of People v. 
Blakeman, 170 Ca. 2d 596, 339 P.2d 202 (1959) because it involved a 
case where the trial judge failed to set a limit, not where a statutory 
limit was lacking. Although correct, respondent fails to grasp the 
principle reiterated by the California Court that "when the probationary 
period is not specified it is deemed to be for the maximum possible 
period of imprisonment." 339 P.2d at 204. And see Appellant's Brief 
p. 8. 
Respondent cites the United States Supreme Court case of 
Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 23 L. Ed. 2d 162, 89 S. Ct. 
1503 (1969) for the proposition that probation periods can be longer 
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than maximum periods for incarceration. Again respondent misses 
the thrust of appellant's argument. Mr. Justice Marshall, in the 
segment of his opinion quoted by respondent at page 6 of its brief, 
points out that a federal statute specifically provides for a longer 
period of probation than the period of imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C. 
§3653. The Frank case therefore, does not address itself to the 
issue involved in the instant appeal because no legislative vacuum, 
such as exists in Utah, exists in the federal system. 
Finally, respondent cites the American Bar Association's 
Standards for Criminal Justice as authority for the proposition that 
probation terms may be longer than jail terms. Respondent states 
"The American Bar Association suggests two years probation for a 
misdemeanor and up to five for a felony". Respondents brief page 7. 
Respondent has misconstrued and overlooked the American Bar Association 
true position on the question. The sub-section referred to by 
respondent reads in its entirety as follows: 
11
 (d) The court should specify at the time of sentencing 
the length of any term during which the defendant is to 
be supervised and during which the court will retain power 
to revoke the sentence for the violation of specified 
conditions. Neither supervision nor the power to 
revoke should be permitted to extend beyond a legislatively 
fixed time, which should in no event exceed two years 
for a misdemeanor or five years for a felony." 
A.B.A. Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating 
to Probation, Approved Draft 1970, §1.1 
It should be clear that rather than recommending two years 
probation for a misdemeanor and five years for a felony, the Standards 
urge an absolute maximum of those terms. Most important for purposes 
of this appeal however, is the fact that the Standards urge that 
probation not be allowed to extend beyond a legislatively fixed 
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maximum. It is clear that the American Bar Association Standards 
fully support appellant's position that all states should have such 
a legislative maximum. What that maximum is should be up to the 
state legislatures. However, where the legislature has not 
established such a maximum period for probation, appellant urges 
this court to accept the uncontradicted weight of authority and fill 
the void by limiting probation to the maximum period for 
incarceration. 
It may very well be that if the Utah legislature acts on 
this issue they would adopt the positions of other Western States 
and legislatively establish the limit for probation as being the 
same as the limit for incarceration. Whether or not that happens, 
however, is immaterial to this appeal. The f^ct is, a legislative 
void exists which must be filled by this Court
 t 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent has failed to cite a single authority which 
refutes appellant's position that where no maximum period for 
probation is fixed by the legislature, the maximum should be the 
same as the limit for incarceration. Subsequent legislative action 
pursuant to the numerous court decisions which stand for that 
proposition, have in no way affected the proposition even though 
that respective legislature may have chosen to make the maximums 
different. There seems to be no conflict among the authorities that 
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such a maximum period for probation is a necessity to our precepts 
of Due Process of Law. In our sister state Idaho, whose statute 
was almost exactly the same as ours, the Idaho Supreme Court 
established the position taken by appellant. The American Bar 
Association Standards support the necessity for such a maximum 
and virtually every court which has moved to establish a maximum 
where a legislative void existed has used the maximum period of 
incarceration as the standard. Appellant strongly urges this Court 
to follow the great weight of authority and established logic and 
adopt the same standard. 
DATED this ^ O d a y of September, 1976. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LARRY 
Attorn^ for Appellant 
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